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Toward a Uniform Code of Police Justice
Monu Bedit

I. INTRODUCTION

The recent (and seemingly consistent) news of police abuses has led
to significant discussion on how best to curtail this conduct.' A common
reaction is that we need to do a better job of making sure that officers
are subject to appropriate criminal sanctions for their behavior. 2 While
espousing a similar refrain, this Article takes a step back and wrestles
with a more fundamental question. Why are police officers-given their
unique responsibilities and powers-subject to the same criminal code
as everyone else? I analogize to soldiers who have their own set of
criminal laws under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Given the similarities between soldiers and police officers-both carry
guns, are part of a hierarchal structure, and most notably, are tasked to
protect society through use of force and possibly deadly force-it stands
to reason that both groups should be subject to unique laws specifically
tailored to their respective duties and responsibilities. I argue that a
uniform code of police justice would ultimately be more effective in
regulating police behavior and deterring instances of abuse.
t Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. A.B. Dartmouth College,
M.Phil. University of Cambridge, J.D. Harvard University. I would like to thank the participants
of The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium as well as the editors of the Legal Forum.
' See, e.g., Andrea Ritchie & Joey Mogul, In the Shadows of the War on Terror: Persistent
Police Brutality and Abuse of People of Color in the United States, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 175
(2008); Protests over Police Violence, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/feature/protests-overpolice-violencel [https:Iperma.cc/3UK9-PKY6] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016); Richard Perez-Peiia,
Fatal Police Shootings: Accounts Since Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/08/us/fatal-police-shooting-accounts.html [https://perma.cc/3AX4YXDP]; John Wihbey & Leighton Walter Kille, Excessive or Reasonable Force by Police? Research
on Law Enforcement and Racial Conflict, JOURNALIST RESOURCE (Oct. 29,
http://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/Criminal-justice/police-reasonable-force-

2015),

brutality-race-research-review-statistics [https://perma.cc/3KVM-ZVCM].
2 See, e.g., Asit S. Panwala, The Failure of Local and Federal Prosecutors to Curb
Police
Brutality, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 (2003); Editorial Board, Police Abuse Cases Need Special
Prosecutors, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/police-abusecases-need-special-prosecutors/2014/12/06/fcf57e28-7cd6- 1 1e4-b82 1-503cc7efed9e-story.html
[https://perma.cclWJK7-SDEW]; Brian Beutler, Police Unions Aren't the Problem, NEW REPUBLIC
2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/121736/police-unions-arent-problem-local(May
7,
prosecutors-are [https://perma.cc/GK6W-KQWB].
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The last few years have brought national attention to concerns of
police misconduct. One only needs to read about the cases of Michael
Brown, 3 Sandra Bland, 4 and Eric Garner,5 to see the severity of the
problem and the need for reform. In a recent civil suit relating to police
use of deadly force, Justice Sotomayor lamented the culture of police
brutality and violence.6 There have been a host of proposed reforms
that seek to ameliorate the situation, including, for example, better
training of police officers,7 broader use of civil remedies, 8 greater
involvement of community members in police oversight, 9 and more
stringent application of criminal law to police behavior.10
This Article-while working within the criminal law reform
framework-goes one step further and seeks to change the substantive
criminal rules that apply to police officers when performing their
duties. Currently, these individuals are subject to the same criminal
laws as everyone else. The elements of relevant crimes such as assault
and homicide make no distinction between officers and non-officers.11 I
argue that current laws are not sufficiently tailored to regulate a police
officer's unique responsibilities and powers.
I use soldiers and the UCMJ as a counterpart. We, as a society,
recognize that military personnel have a special role to play. 12 They are
tasked to defend the country through the use of force and, often, deadly
force. While we honor their service, we recognize the need for special
obligations commensurate with their duties. So goes the rationale for

See, e.g., Q & A: What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.comlinteractive/20 14/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.

html [https://perma.cc/UU4K-R8EF].
4 See infra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
' See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) ("But the [officer's glib] comment [after the
shooting] seems to me revealing of the culture this Court's decision supports when it calls it
reasonable-or even reasonably reasonable-to use deadly force for no discernible gain and over a
supervisor's express order to 'stand by.' By sanctioning a 'shoot first, think later' approach to
policing, the Court renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.") (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
See, e.g., Phillip Swarts, Police Need Better Training and Community Relations,
Presidential Task Force Is Told, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2 015/jan/1 3/police-brutality-solutions-are-training-community-/?page=all [https://perma.
cc/P8T3-3DPT]; Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-force-policewarily-learn-to-de-escalate.html [https://perma.cc/QGU5-5LL8].
8 See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3189, 3243 (2014).
' See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Stakeholder Participation in the Selection and
Recruitment of Police: Democracy in Action, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 10 (2012).
'0

See supra note 2.

"

See infra Part II.B.

*

See infra Part II.A.
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promulgating the UCMJ and its unique criminal provisions. 13 This code
includes crimes such as dereliction of duty and conduct unbecoming an
officer-distinct liability rules that have no counterpart in the civilian
criminal code. 14
Police officers, too, are uniquely positioned in our society. They also
are tasked to defend communities against threats to safety and
security. Carrying out these duties-which includes questioning or
detaining suspects-similarly requires the power to use force, and even
deadly force. 15 While there are certainly differences between the roles of
police officers and soldiers, their unique status and powers put these
two groups in a separate category compared to all other professions
and, in turn, point to the need for special criminal rules to regulate
their respective duties.
It actually turns out that the current criminal code already treats
police officers differently, although it does so in a partial and somewhat
inconsistent way. Rather than impose any distinct affirmative liability,
states have created separate rules for officers on the back end. 16 Police
officers get the benefit of special defenses not available to others such
as the ability to use reasonable or justifiable force." Though these
allowances make sense given an officer's duties, we need affirmative
criminal laws-similar to the UCMJ provision-that are equally
tailored to an officer's responsibilities.1 8
It is important to note that the Article is focused less on the
construction of a uniform police code and more on the conceptual
framework that justifies its existence. However, we do not need to look
that far for possible crimes that could be included. Police department
policies or manuals provide a good starting point. They already contain
specific provisions on the use of force and the role of ethical
responsibilities. 19 My proposal, crudely put, is to criminalize these
provisions that currently only result in civil penalties such as demotion
or termination. This could include specific provisions such as the
prohibition of chokeholds when detaining individuals, an obligation to
de-escalate an encounter, or a requirement of professionalism when
interacting with citizens. 20 These changes would make it easier for

1
14

See id.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.A.
1
Some states do impose affirmative liability in the form of "oppression statutes" but these
rules are not designed to provide effective deterrence. See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying

15

text.
7

See infra Part III.B.

1

See id.

1

See infra Part III.C.
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See infra Parts III.C.1 and III.C.3.
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prosecutors to bring charges and instill greater confidence in police
accountability. 2 1
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a primer on
military justice and a sampling of the unique crimes contained in the
UCMJ. Part II makes the argument for a uniform police criminal code.
It begins by detailing the similarity between police officers and soldiers
and how this association supports a unique criminal code tailored to
each group's respective responsibilities and duties. It goes on to use
police department polices as a starting point for the creation of distinct
crimes for police officers. Part III focuses on the benefits of this kind of
criminal code and tackles some practical considerations for its
implementation.
II. MILITARY JUSTICE: CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR SOLDIERS

The Rationale for a Separate System: Military Procedure vs.
Military Specific Crimes

A.

The United States has always treated soldiers differently from
citizens when it comes to criminal justice. 22 This takes the form of
separate procedures as well as unique substantive criminal laws. 2 3
Military process has a number of distinctive features: to name a few,
soldiers are tried through non-judicial punishment or courts-martial; 24
all the relevant players (lawyers, judges, and juries) are military
personnel; 25 and perhaps most significant, and contrary to the civilian
system, military commanders rather than prosecutors wield decisionmaking authority over charges and pleas. 26
This process works side-by-side with a unique set of substantive
criminal laws. Soldiers are subject to a separate set of criminal rules
that arise directly from their role as a fighting force. 27 The original
See infra Part IV.A.
See generally Bradley Nicholson, Courts-Martial in the Legion Army: American Military
Law in the Early Republic, 1792-1796, 144 MIL. L. REV. 77, 79 (1994) (discussing early American
history of military justice); David Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey,
87 MIL. L. REV. 129, 165 (1980) (discussing American history of military justice through the
Uniform Code of Military Justice).
22
See, e.g., David Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215
MIL. L. REV. 1, 50-71 (2013) (detailing the distinct procedures and substantive crimes of the
military criminal justice system).
2
See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C., §§ 815-16 (2012) (describing commanding officer's non-judicial
punishment and classifying courts-martial).
See id. §§ 822-29 (describing who may participate in and convene courts-martial).
2
26
See id. §§ 822-24; Schlueter, supra note 23; Monu Bedi, Unraveling Unlawful Command
Influence, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
27
See Nicholson, supra note 22; Schlueter, supra note 23; GEORGE DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE
21

22

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF COURTS-MARTIAL AND OTHER MLITARY TRIBUNALS 342-43 (J. Wiley

& Sons, 3rd ed. 1915) (indicating that soldiers in the early Republic were governed by the Articles
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military code-called the Articles of War-subjected soldiers to a wide
assortment of crimes, including rape and murder as well as uniquely
military crimes such as desertion, disobedience of orders, dereliction of
duty, and conduct unbecoming an officer. 28 The rationale for these
military-oriented crimes seems somewhat obvious. Soldiers are tasked
to defend this country, which often requires assaulting and killing
individuals as part of the mission. So it is imperative to enforce good
order and discipline by effectively regulating soldiers' duties. 29 This
necessitates crafting criminal liability rules that are not applicable to
civilian society. 30 Obedience and readiness to fight, for instance, are
essential qualities that must be enforced among soldiers, 3 1 On the other
hand, these qualities would have no role to play in promoting law
abiding civilians. 32
B.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice and Substantive Military
Crimes

The UCMJ passed by Congress shortly after World War II, was in
many ways a watershed moment. While it continued the commandcentric nature of military procedure, 33 it finally gave defendants some
of the same procedural rights that civilian defendants already enjoyed
such as the prohibition against self-incrimination, 34 double jeopardy
protection, 35 and extensive appellate review 3 6 to name a few. Relevant

of War).

8 See Davis, supra note 27, at 378 (Article 21 (criminalizing disobedience of orders)), 419-29
(Article 47 (criminalizing desertion)), 439-56 (Article 58 (prohibiting common law crimes such as
larceny and murder during time of war)), 468-72 (Article 61 (criminalizing conduct unbecoming an
office)), 472-78 (Article 62 (criminalizing neglect of duty)); Edmund M. Morgan, The Background
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953).
"

See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012) [hereinafter "MCM"],

amended by Exec. Order 13593, 3 C.F.R. 13593 (2011) [https://perma.cc/U48S-ZGTK] (The MCM
was an executive order that effected the UCMJ provisions. Id. at Part I, 1 4.); see Schlueter, supra
note 23, at 6.
* See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) (saying "[t]he military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian," and that "the
rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands

of discipline and duty"); William Moorman, Fifty Years of Military Justice: Does the Uniform Code
of Military Justice Need to Be Changed?, 48 A.F. L. REV. 185 (2000).
31 See Parker, 417 U.S. at 744; United States v. McCarty, 29 C.M.R. 757, 762 (C.G.B.R. 1960);
Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders:Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939
(1998); Moorman, supra note 30, at 187-88
3' Cf. Moorman, supra note 30, at 188 ("No civilian parallel can be drawn. Civilian employers
can't compel subordinates to perform tasks resulting in substantial likelihood of death, much less
come to work on time.").

* See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822-29.
* See id. § 831 (indicating that compulsory self-incrimination is prohibited).
* See id. § 844(a) ("No person may, without his consent, be tried a second time for the same
offense").
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expanded upon the substantive
War, including general as well as
two military crimes that are most
police code. 38

1. Dereliction of duty and the negligence standard.
The crime of dereliction of duty involves a soldier who fails to
perform her required duties. 39 The key elements are that the defendant
had certain duties; that she knew or reasonably should of known of the
duties; and that she either willfully or negligently failed in the
performance of those duties. 40 These duties can be imposed by a variety
of sources, including by "treaty, statute, regulation, lawful order,
standard operating procedure, or custom of the service." 41 It is no
surprise that military courts have therefore prosecuted soldiers in a
broad range of cases, including, for example, violating rules of
engagement relating to use of military dogs on prisoners, 42 general
orders to report drug use by subordinates, 43 and professional medical
ethical standards in connection with patient care.4 4
It is worth pointing out that military courts do not necessarily
require a willful or intentional violation of duty, though this type of
case carries the most severe punishment. 45 Soldiers can still be
prosecuted for mere negligence or, in other words, soldiers can still be
prosecuted if a reasonable soldier under the same circumstances would
have known about the duty and not engaged in the prohibited
conduct. 46 This standard is stricter than what is typically expected for a
civilian prosecution, where simple negligence is not sufficient for a

See id. §§ 859-76 (outlining the rules of the appeals process).
See id. §§ 877-934 (enumerating the punitive articles of the UCMJ).
38
While the UCMJ built upon the crimes of dereliction of duty and conduct unbecoming an
officer, these offenses were part of the original Articles of War. See supra note 28.
3 See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892(3) (outlining punishment for dereliction in the performance of
duties). If the dereliction is based upon an order, it may be a lesser-included offense to a charge of
disobedience of that order. See United States v. Bivins, 49 M.J. 328 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (defendant
charged with violating lawful general order regarding underage drinking and found guilty of lesser
included offense of dereliction of duty); UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892(1)-(2) (outlining the elements of
the crime of violation of lawful order).
40 See MCM at Part IV, ¶ 16b(3) and I 16c(3)c.
41 See id. at Part IV, I 16c(3)c.
42
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.M.A. 2010).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Dupree, 25 M.J. 659 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Rust, 38 M.J. 726 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993).
4 See MCM, Part IV, T 16e(3).
46 Id., T 16c3(c) ('"Negligently' means an act or omission of a person who is under a duty to
use due care which exhibits a lack of that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would
3
"

have exercised under the same or similar circumstances").
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criminal violation. 4 7 United States v. Rust 48 provides a good example of
the more expansive military standard.4 9 A military obstetrician was
convicted of dereliction of duty for failing to personally examine and
provide proper medical care to a pregnant patient.5 0 There was no
evidence that the doctor intentionally withheld treatment; rather, he
was simply negligent in failing to meet the appropriate standard of
care.5 1 This lack of reasonable care, however, was sufficient to make out
a crime of dereliction of duty.52 In the civilian system, this kind of
simple negligence by a doctor would only subject that doctor to
potential tort or financial liability for medical malpractice, but no
criminal sanctions. 5 3
2. Conduct unbecoming an officer.
Conduct unbecoming of an officer is a more general provision that
applies only to officers. 54 Officers are held to a higher standard and
expected to inspire trust and the respect of their subordinates.5 5 The
crime uses general language and prohibits any "action or behavior in an
official capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the person as an
officer, seriously compromises the officer's character as a gentleman, or
action or behavior in an unofficial. . . capacity which, in dishonoring or
disgracing the officer personally, seriously compromises the person's

47 Under the civilian standard, gross negligence not simple negligence is generally required
before a defendant can be held criminally responsible. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed
Official Draft 1985) (defining gross negligence as minimum required culpability); Leslie Yalof
Garfield, A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A Prescription for the
Legislature, 65 TENN. L. REV. 875, 886, 904 (1998) ("Legislatures and courts generally disallow
criminal punishment for careless conduct, absent proof of gross negligence"); United States v.
Lawson, 36 M.J. 415. 421-22 (C.M.A. 1993) (noting that, contrary to the civilian standard, simple
negligence, not gross negligence, is sufficient for the crime of dereliction of duty). Civilian courts,
however, have permitted criminal punishment for simple negligence for environmental crimes
involving widespread injury. See Garfield, supra note 47, at n.134, n.138 (citing cases and
statutes).
48
38 M.J. 726 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993).
49
See id. at 729.
5
See id. at 728.
" See id.
52
See id. ("In our view, medical malpractice by an officer whose military duties require him
to provide medical care may be punished as dereliction in duty.").
53 Jeffrey Parness, State Damage Cap and Separation of Powers, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 145
(2011).
5
See MCM, Part IV, ¶ 59a.
5i See id. at ¶ 59c(2); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) ("We have also recognized that
a military officer holds a particular position of responsibility and command in the Armed Forces.");
United States v. Frazier, 34 M.J. 194, 198 (C.M.A. 1992) ("We note that one critically important
responsibility of a military officer is to inspire the trust and respect of the enlisted soldiers who
must obey his orders and follow his leadership.").

20

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

standing as an officer." 5 6 The lack of specificity in this provision is

intentional; the crime serves as a catch-all provision that sweeps in
conduct that may not otherwise fall under an explicit UCMJ
provision.5 7 Examples of conduct unbecoming of an officer can include
acts

of "dishonesty,

unfair

dealing,

. .

. lawlessness,

injustice

or

cruelty."58 Military courts have prosecuted officers under this provision
for a wide variety of behavior, including having an "unprofessional
relationship" with a subordinate, 59 charging fellow officers for tutoring
lessons,6 0 and engaging in public drunkenness while in uniform. 6 1
C.

Service Connected Crimes

Soldiers can be prosecuted for a crime even if it has no connection
to their military service. 62 Their status as active duty military
personnel alone provides the relevant trigger to subject them to the
UCMJ. 6 3 This was not always the case. In the late 1960s, the Supreme
Court briefly adopted a service connection requirement for courtmartial jurisdiction. 64 The Court came up with a multi-factor test to
determine whether the putative crime was committed while in the
performance of a soldier's military duty.65 For example, a soldier
committing an offense outside the military base and after hours would
not be subject to military jurisdiction. 66 A later decision removed this
service requirement altogether, finding it too difficult to administer

56

MCM at Part IV,

1 59c(2).
See generally Elizabeth Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and "Conduct
Unbecoming", 26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 6-8 (2008) (discussing the long history of the statute in American
military life and its strategic vagueness); United States v. Bilby, 39 M.J. 467, 470 (C.M.A. 1994)
("It is not necessary, under [conduct unbecoming an officer], that the conduct of the officer, itself,
otherwise be a crime."). Relying on the unique nature of military society, the Supreme Court has
upheld the statute against claims of void for vagueness under due process. See Parker, 417 U.S. at
756-57.
5 MCM, Part IV, ¶ 59c(2).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 54 M.J. 244 (C.M.A. 2000).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 28 M.J. 179 (C.M.A. 1998).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Schumacher, 11 M.J. 612 (A.C.M.R. 1981).
62
See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
6
See, e.g., UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (outlining which members of the military can be courtmartialed).
64 See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (holding that an off-duty soldier did not
commit a service-related act that created court-martial jurisdiction when he allegedly broke into a
hotel and assaulted someone).
6
See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 365 (1971) (the Court used twelve factors,
including, for instance, whether the crime was committed off base, whether the victim was a
solider, among other considerations).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Saulter, 5 M.J. 281 (C.M.A. 1978) (action was not service
connected because soldier engaged in after hours, off base drug offense while in civilian clothes).
57
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and, moreover, concluding that its removal more faithfully adhered to
Congress' plenary authority over the military system.6 7
III. TOWARD A UNIFORM CODE OF POLICE JUSTICE
The Similar Roles of Police Officers and Soldiers

A.

Police officers and soldiers have a lot in common. Both carry guns,
wear uniforms, work in hierarchal organizations, and go through
extensive training pipelines. 68 It is no surprise that becoming a police
officer is a common second career for veterans. 69 More importantly,
both groups are tasked to protect society and uniquely sanctioned to
use physical force-including deadly force, if necessary-to carry out
their duties. 70 The recent "militarization" of many police departmentsfor better or worse-further underscores this association." Soldiers,
however, typically deal with external threats and are deployed
overseas, whereas police officers are tasked with dealing with internal
See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 436 (overruling O'Callahan,supra note 64).
* See, e.g., Elizabeth Price Foley, The "War" Against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization,
and the Third Amendment, 82 TENN. L. REV. 583, 593 (2015) ("The question for an originalist,
therefore, would be whether the fact that police officers shared basic characteristics with military
67

'soldiers'-carrying weapons, wearing uniforms, hierarchical organizational structure."); Clayton
Browne, Are Police Academies Like Military Boot Camp, DEMAND MEDIA, [https://perma.cc/MA6W-

TF43] (discussing respective training pipelines, including the fact that both boot camp and police
academies provide firearm training).
69
See, e.g., Mark Clark, Military Vets Joining Law Enforcement, POLICE MAG. (Jan. 30,
2014), http://www.policemag.com/channel/careers-training/articles/2014/01/military-vets-joininglaw-enforcement.aspx [https://perma.cc/W2R9-HB6Y]; Gary Peterson, Military to Police Force: A
Natural

Transition?,

MILITARY.COM,

http: //www.military.com/veteran-jobs/search/law-

enforcement-jobs/military-transition-to-police-force.html

[https://perma.ccl7JE9-GPCE];

Military

Veteran? You Served Your Country, Now Serve Your Community, DISCOVERYPOLICING.ORG,
http:I/discoverpolicing.org/findyour-career/?fa=military-veterans [https://perma.cc/N4ES-TS7Q].

7o See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC "DirectParticipationin Hostilities"Study: No
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769, 820 (2010) ("Thus a
soldier in an armed conflict or a law enforcement officer in a peacetime environment confronted

with a threat will see what may be a threat, identify it as a threat, process that information, and
respond according to his or her training, rules of engagement (in the case of the soldier) or rules
for use of deadly force (in the case of the police officer)."); Samantha A. Lovin, Note, Everyone
Forgets About the Third Amendment: Exploring the Implications on Third Amendment Case Law
of Extending Its Prohibitionsto Include Actions by State Police Officers, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 529, 545 (2014) (citing James P. Rogers, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic Disasters, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 747, 749 (2008)) ("the drafters may not have necessarily anticipated
the existence of the armed and uniformed peace-keeping corps that make up the law enforcement

agencies of today"); Stephen Coleman, Possible Ethical Problems with Military Use of Non-Lethal
Weapons, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 185, 198 (2015) (discussing that both soldiers and police
officer are authorized to use deadly force though soldiers are expected to kill the enemy).
71
See, e.g., Foley, supra note 68, at 584-89; Sean Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus
Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383, 385-86 (2003)
(arguing that the proliferation of SWAT teams is an example of increased police militarization);
Matt Apuzzo, War Gear Flows to Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 8, 2014), http://www.
[https://perma.cc/UU4Hnytimes.com/2014/06/09/us/war-gear-flows-to-police-departments.html
52BU].
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threats and are expected to keep communities safe. 72 Still, the ability to
use force in protecting society puts these two groups in a category
distinct from other professions.
Add to this a key justification for criminal laws-namely the need
to regulate citizen behavior and deter people from harming other
citizens. 73 This rationale should apply equally to soldiers and police
officers. Given both groups' unique roles in society, it is only logical that
we draft criminal rules specifically designed to make sure neither
oversteps its bounds when executing these special responsibilities.
There are, of course, material differences between soldiers and
police officers. For example, one difference is the sanctioned use of
physical force. A soldier's duty is more straightforward and one-sided.
As part of engaging the enemy, she is expected to kill. 7 4 Use of force by
a police officer is more complicated, on account of an officer's broader
authority as a peace officer.75 This role often only includes questioning
a suspect or otherwise interacting with a citizen, and only if necessary
arresting or detaining someone.7 6 The use physical force-and obviously
deadly force-may or may not be justified depending on the
circumstances.7 7 This key difference, however, simply speaks to the
specific contours of a unique criminal code-not to whether it should
exist. Regulating police officer behavior, will likely require specific
regulations on use of force that are not necessary for soldiers.7 8
A similar analysis applies to a soldier's service obligation and the
requirement to obey superior officers. Soldiers are legally required to
serve for multiple year periods whereas police officers are free to resign

72

Compare Deployment: An Overview, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/deployment/

deployment-overview.html [https://perma.cc/L7Z2-P9GF] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016), with SEATTLE
POLICE DEP'T, MANUAL:

CODE OF ETHICS, http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/general-policy-

information/code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/Y83P-FM4J] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
7
See generally Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a
Criminal Law Principleof ComparativeFault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1994).
74 See, e.g., Joseph McNamara, The Police and Violent Crime, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 491,
502 (1994) (quoting General Colin Powell for the propositions that "a soldier's duty is to kill the
enemy" and "police officers are supposed to be peace officers").
7
See id.
71 See, e.g., Kealy, supra note 71, at 386-87 ("Whereas soldiers must attack and defeat an
enemy, police officers are charged with not only protecting the community from lawbreakers, but
also protecting the constitutional rights of those alleged lawbreakers that they arrest. Whereas
soldiers are trained to inflict maximum damage in many situations, police officers have a duty to
use minimum force, and only when reasonably justified, in accomplishing their mission.").
7
See, e.g., Michael Lewis, Ethics and Operational Realities of War on Terror, 50 S. TEX. L.
REV. 837, 842 (2009) ("The difference in mindset between a soldier and a police officer can be
summed up this way: A soldier's best friend is his rifle; a police officer's best friend is his radio.
That does not mean soldiers do not use radios and police do not use guns, but it does indicate
where they are trained to turn when things do not go as planned.").
7
See infra Part IlI.C.1.
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from their job at any time.79 Additionally, obedience to superior officers
and following orders play a much greater role in military life than in
the police system.80 But again, these differences only go to what the
relevant crimes should be, not to whether these groups should be
subject to a separate criminal code. For example, it makes sense that
desertion and disobedience of orders are part of the military code, but
would not necessarily be essential components of a police code.8 1
Soldiers also typically work alongside other soldiers and are
generally segregated from the civilian population. They work on bases
almost exclusively with other military personnel and can be deployed
overseas with other military units. 82 Police officers, on the other hand,
routinely interact with members of the community in carrying out their
duties.8 3 In fact, their job necessitates this interaction. Whether it is
interviewing citizens, questioning suspects, conducting traffic stops, or
making arrests, all of these actions by definition require interfacing
with citizens.
This difference between solider and police life-while presenting
an interesting contrast-is not really pertinent to my specific proposal
for a unique criminal code, or at least does not pose a challenge to it.
We are talking about criminal liability for police officers in connection
with their responsibilities, and commensurate powers, as keepers of the
peace and protectors of the community. In this way, there is an
undeniable nexus between the responsibilities of officers and soldiers.
This does not mean that the varying level of interaction with the
general population is not applicable to criminal justice. But perhaps it
says more about how these crimes should be prosecuted and less about
what crimes should be prosecuted. I will discuss this point in more
detail below. 84 For now, it is enough to say that the shared

'

a

See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 651 (defining service obligation of soldiers).
See id. at § 892 (criminalizing failure to obey lawful superior order); Monu Bedi,

Entrapped:A Reconceptualizationof the Obedience to Orders Defense, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2103, 2132

(discussing how implicit obedience is a necessary feature for an effective military force). It is still
important for police to respect the chain of command. See, e.g., SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T,
MANUAL: CHAIN OF COMMAND (2014), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-1--department-

administration/1020--chain-of-command [https://perma.cclHXL9-P2YF].
8 See supra note 80; UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 885 (describing the elements of desertion). Failure to
follow orders within the police structure can still result in disciplinary actions. See, e.g., Longton v.
Village of Corinth, 869 N.Y.S.2d 682 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2008) (police officer suspended for failing to
obey direct order by chief of police).
82
See, e.g., Military Life, MYFUTURE.COM, http://www.myfuture.com/military/articles-advice/
military-life [https://perma.cc/6GUS-FK3DI (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (discussing military life,
including life on military bases and deployments); Deployment: An Overview, supra note 72.
&3

See,

e.g.,

SEATTLE

POLICE

DEP'T,

MANUAL:

MISSION

STATEMENTAND

http: /www.seattle.gov/police-manual/general-policy-information/code-of-ethics
WT6Z-ASEN] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
' See infra Part IV.C.

PRIORITIES,

[https://perma.cc/
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responsibilities of police officers and soldiers-most notably their
sanctioned use of physical force-puts them in a separate category
relative to all other professions and, in turn, points to the need for
special criminal rules to regulate these duties.
B.

Police Accommodations Within the Civilian Criminal Code

Police abuses were historically handled either through civil assault
suits brought by citizens against police officers or, less often, criminal
prosecutions brought by states under their general criminal code. 85 In
both scenarios, police officers-in defending their actions-had the
ability to use self-defense provisions or the common law rule permitting
reasonable force in effectuating a lawful arrest.8 6 The current civilian
code has simply codified this state of affairs. As the discussion below
will demonstrate, states continue to treat officers differently, although
end up doing so in a partial and inconsistent way.
By and large, police officers and non-police officers are subject to
the same criminal laws. The elements of relevant crimes such as
assault and homicide are the same for both groups. These crimes
typically require a specific mens rea together with some physical act
resulting in injury. 7 These elements make no distinction between
conduct by police officers and non-police officers.8 8

8 See, e.g., Karney v. Boyd, 203 N.W. 371 (Wis. 1925) (affirming a plaintiffs civil action for
false imprisonment against defendant officers); Rachel Harmon, When Is Police Violence
Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119, 1148-49 (2008) (discussing the history of excessive force
actions at common law); John Barker Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 TEX. L. REV. 279, 283-84 (1945)
(examining the different standards for lawfulness in false arrest actions when the officer is a
defendant in a civil suit and a criminal prosecution).
16 See Harmon, supra note 85, at 1149; Waite, supra note 85, at 301-03 (examining the
reasonable force requirement in false arrest civil actions and criminal prosecutions); Rollin M.
Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 265-67 (1940) (discussing reasonable force in
civil suits and criminal prosecutions for false arrests).
7A simple assault (or battery in some jurisdictions) usually requires a person to
intentionally or recklessly make offensive contact or injure a person. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 784.03(1)(a) (West 2007) (under Florida law, a battery occurs when a person intentionally strikes
a person or causes bodily harm); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-3 (Lexis 2015) (under Illinois
Law, a battery occurs when a person knowingly makes unwanted physical contact or causes bodily
harm); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 2010) (under New York law, a person commits an
assault if she intentionally or recklessly causes injury to another); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 211.1(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Aggravating factors such as the nature of the injury
(e.g. severe bodily injury) may justify a more severe charge such as aggravated assault. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.021; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-3.05; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Homicide charges require a specific state of
mind (e.g. recklessness) along with the victim's death. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1985). Here, too, depending on the level of intent, an actor may be subject
to a more severe charge. See id. § 210.1(2). For example, negligently or recklessly causing the
death of a person is generally considered manslaughter, whereas intentionally causing the death
of a person can result in the greater charge of murder. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07(1) (defining
manslaughter with negligence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (defining murder with intent); 720 ILL.
COM-P. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3 (defining involuntary manslaughter with recklessness); 720 ILL. COMP.
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State criminal codes, however, do make allowances for police
officers when it comes to defenses to these crimes. Take the crime of
assault. It is typically defined as intentionally causing injury to another
person and, again, makes no reference to police officers. 8 9 To
accommodate police duties, state codes promulgate additional
provisions that explicitly allow these individuals to use justified
physical force in order to arrest or capture a suspect. 90 These provisions
require that the force be reasonable under the circumstances. 91
Similarly, when it comes to homicide charges, states have adopted
broader self-defense rules for police officers than for other individuals.
States typically require an imminent threat of serious bodily harm
before allowing a citizen to use deadly force against her aggressor, and
some states even require individuals to retreat if possible. 92 Police have
greater leeway. Officers have no duty to retreat and, in some
jurisdictions, can kill even if there is no imminent threat of deadly
harm 9

On some level, the special defenses for police officers make sense.
Part of a police officer's job is to make arrests and keep the peace.
These duties necessarily implicate the potential of assaulting citizens
and, if necessary, killing them. 94 But it is not clear why these defenses
STAT. ANN. 5/9-2 (defining murder with intent); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (defining manslaughter
with recklessness); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (defining murder with intent); MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.2 (defining murder with a purposeful or knowing state of mind); id. § 210.3 (defining
manslaughter with reckless state of mind); id. § 210.4 (defining negligent homicide with criminal
negligent state of mind).
8

See supra note 87.

89

See supra note 87.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.05 (explaining that police officer allowed to use reasonable
force in effectuating arrest); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-5 (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30
(same); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.07 (police officer allowed to use force in effectuating arrest), 3.09
90

(requiring that police officer's use of force not be e negligent or reckless).
" See supra note 90; cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-98 (1989) (discussing general
reasonableness requirement for use of justifiable police force under the Fourth Amendment).
92
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requiring that deadly
force be "immediately necessary" and requiring retreat if possible); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15
(requiring that aggressor is "using or about to use deadly physical force" before allowing use of
deadly force in self-defense and requiring retreat if possible); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(1)
(requiring "imminent threat of death or great bodily harm" before allowing use of deadly force but
not requiring retreat); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-4 (requiring that there be an "imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm" before allowing use of deadly force and requiring retreat if
possible).
9
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (no requirement police
officer retreat or threatened harm be imminent before using deadly force); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/7-5 (no requirement that police officer must retreat before using deadly force and no
requirement that there be an imminent or immediate threat of serious bodily injury to officer or
others); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (no requirement that police must retreat before using deadly
force); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.05 (no requirement that threat of serious bodily injury or death be

immediate or imminent).
94

These unique defenses thus probably stand as analogous to the military defense of
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are crafted in such an open-ended manner. Take an officer's justified
use of physical force in making an arrest. State codes typically paint
with a broad brush and use very general language to describe the
contours of this justification.9 5 New York law, for example, states that a
police officer can "use physical force when and to the extent he or she
reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, or to
prevent the escape from custody."9 6 There is no mention of specific acts
that may or not may not be prohibited in carrying out these duties.
Similarly, take an officer's use of deadly force even if there is no
imminent harm. Here, too, state codes rely on very general language
that defers to an officer's judgment.97 Illinois, for example, provides
that an officer can use deadly force "when he reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself
or such other person." 98 These provisions allow officers to use force, and
potentially kill if it is reasonable, without much guidance on the
specific circumstances under which either is acceptable. 99 The
vagueness of the statute, in turn, leaves prosecutors with significant
discretion (perhaps too much) on whether to bring charges and gives
juries significant latitude on whether to convict an officer. 100
The difference between the more developed general justification
rules and the less developed police use-of-force defenses may not be
surprising given the early American focus on private citizens playing
an active role in reporting crimes and making arrests. As Professor
Rachel Harmon explains, "In a world without professional police forces
or frequent interactions between the police and suspects, there would
have been much less opportunity and motive for police violence."10 1 By
contrast, the more common occurrence of citizens playing law
enforcement roles necessitated more developed common law rules for

obedience to orders. This unique military defense allows military personal to engage in conduct
that would otherwise be a criminal act if committed by a civilian. A soldier can argue that she
committed the act because she was ordered to do them by a superior officer and at the time didn't
realize they were unlawful. See MCM, supra note 29, at R.C.M. 916(d). Given the importance of
obedience in military life, it is imperative soldiers can make out such a defense. See Bedi, supra
note 80. A successful application of this defense also carries a reasonableness or objective
requirement. See id.

5 See supra note 90.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1) (emphasis added).
97 See supra note 93.
18 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-5 (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Toussaint Cummings, Note, I Thought He Had a Gun: Amending New York's
Justification Statute to Prevent Police Officers from Mistakenly Shooting Unarmed Black Men, 12
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 781 (2014) (arguing that current justification laws need to be
9

changed to prevent unwarranted shootings).

1n
'01

See generally infra Part III.C.
See Harmon, supra note 85, at 1149.
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self-defense. 1 02 This state of affairs thus left little attention to the
question of police force accountability in early American cases. 103 The
eventual rise of a professional police force, according to Harmon, did
not bring commensurate attention to specific justification defenses for
this group of individuals. 10 4
Moving beyond the merits of these defenses, it also seems
somewhat inconsistent to provide for them but not employ distinct
affirmative criminal liability. Why should police officers-on account of
their unique duties-get the benefit of special defenses unavailable to
non-officers but not the commensurate burden of additional criminal
liability? To be sure, this asymmetry is not present in the military
system-which opts for a distinct criminal code that applies across both
crimes and their defenses-where soldiers, too, must kill and assault in
their line of work.105
It is worth noting, however, that some states do impose affirmative
criminal liability on police officers in the form of "official oppression
statutes."1 0 6 These are broadly worded laws that make it a crime for a
police officer or other official to abuse her power. 107 A typical statute
reads as follows: "A public servant . . . commits official oppression if,
with actual knowledge that his conduct is illegal, he . . . [s]ubjects

another to arrest, detention, search seizure, mistreatment. . . ."108 At
first blush, this may seem like an effective deterrent but upon closer
analysis, these provisions are not specifically designed to successfully
curtail bad behavior. For one thing, these are misdemeanor offenses
and so would not have the same deterrent effect of an assault or
homicide charge. 109 Perhaps more significantly, it is hard to prove that
an officer has violated this statute. The mens rea for this type of crime
requires an officer to knowingly violate a lawful duty. 110 This is not
easy to show because it requires assessing the officer's subjective
mental state rather than an objective perspective.'
102

Id.

1os

Id.

104

id.

See supra Part II.A and supra note 94.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 243.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). It seems that roughly
less than half of states have such statutes. See Matthew Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop:
Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, n.213 (collecting
statutes and noting that approximately 20 states have official oppression statutes).
10
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 243.1, supra note 107; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-52-107 (2005);
11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1211 (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/33-3; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00.
'0'

106

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-403 (West 2011).
See Hess, supra note 106, at n. 234 and accompanying text; supra note 107.
See Hess, supra note 106, at 183; supra note 107.
10
" See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (noting the hierarchy
of culpability and that establishing knowledge automatically satisfies negligence standard);
os

109
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This heightened standard is in sharp contrast to the simple
negligence standard found in the dereliction of duty cases--the closest
military analog to oppression statutes-which focuses on an objective
assessment of the situation. These unique features may help explain
why oppression charges are rarely brought against police officers. 112
C.

A Starting Point: Promulgating Police Department Policies

The creation of a model uniform police code would no doubt require
significant work and careful drafting of relevant crimes. The purpose of
my Article is less about constructing one and more about justifying its
existence in the first place. That said, one could look to internal police
department policies as a useful starting point to any such enterprise.
Police departments in most large metropolitan areas across the country
have internal policies that govern an officer's conduct. 113 While these
internal policies are often too general to provide adequate guidance, a
few city departments have promulgated more comprehensive rules and,
perhaps more importantly, occasionally adopted stricter rules than
their respective state criminal codes. 11 4
Just as soldiers can be held criminally liable for violating military
policies or regulations, state jurisdictions-in promulgating a uniform
police code-could also hold officers criminally responsible for violating
Thomas Webster, Note, The End Justifies the Means? Montana v. Egeloff Intoxicates the Right to
Present a Defense, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 425, 455 (1998) (noting that prosecutor's burden is
lowered for proving culpability if dealing with objective versus subjective state); Nancy J. Moore,
Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, n.135 (2010)
("[negligence] is the easiest mental state to prove because it is objective rather than subjective").
112
Federal law also has a broad general criminal provision that subjects police officers to
liability if they deprive a person their constitutional right, which can include physical harm. See
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). But these are hard cases to successfully prosecute since the officer must
commit the violation willfully or with specific intent to cause harm. See 18 U.S.C § 242; Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (finding that the prosecution had not shown an officer intended
to violate an individual's constitutional rights when he was killed during an arrest); United States
v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 496, 499 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (affirming an acquittal of Ohio National
Guardsmen involved in a shooting because the evidence was insufficient to find they had the
specific intent of depriving persons of their constitutional rights); Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop, supra
note 106, at 186-88 (discussing the difficulty in prosecuting police officers under state oppression statutes and
analogous federal law).
13
See generally Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1171, 1177 n.26 (2011) (noting that such policies tend to focus on personnel issues rather than
police protocol).
114
See id.; Gregory Howard Williams, Controlling the Use of Non-Deadly Force: Police and
Practice, 10 HARv. BLACKLEITER J. 79, 83 (1993) ("Many police departments either have no formal
rules on the use of non-deadly force, or have policies that are too vague to provide effective
guidance"). For a list of cities with relatively comprehensive manuals, particularly on use of force
policies, see SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T, MANUAL: USE OF FORCE, http://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/title-8 [https://perma.cclDLN9-R8LJ]; L.A. POLICE DEP'T, MANUAL: POLIcY ON USE
OF FORCE, §556.10, http://www.lapdonline.org/apdmanuall
[https://perma.cc/32HY-65WB];
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP'T MANUAL: USE OF FORCE, 5-300, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/
police/policy/mpdpolicy_5-300_5-300 [https://perma.cc/9QHW-DS7Q].
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specific department polices. I highlight three different areas where
states could use these policies as a mechanism for imposing criminal
sanctions on officers.11 5
1. Excessive force provisions and prohibited conduct.
One of the biggest issues with police conduct seems to be the use of
excessive force in effectuating arrests or otherwise detaining
suspects. 116 Internal police department policies provide a good starting
point for how we can fashion affirmative criminal liability for an
officer's conduct in these situations.
New York City is a prime example of where internal police policies
provide a stricter rule on use of force than the state's criminal code. As
previously mentioned, the state has very general guidelines on an
officer's lawful use of force to arrest a suspect, subjecting it to a general
reasonableness standard. New York City internal police rules, however,
go a step further. For example, these policies explicitly ban officers
from using chokeholds when arresting suspects.1 1 7 The relevant policy
defines a chokehold as "any pressure to the throat or windpipe, which
may prevent or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air."1 18 Currently,
violation of this policy can only lead to disciplinary action such as
demotion or termination. 119 A potential uniform code of police justice
could explicitly outlaw this kind of conduct such that an officer would
120
be subject to a criminal assault charge if she engages in this practice.
This discussion of chokeholds as excessive force is not merely
academic. A change in New York criminal law on this issue could have
drastically altered the outcome of the Eric Garner case, which received
significant media coverage and generated considerable outrage within
the American public. 121 In arresting Garner for illegally selling
It is worth pointing out that these police manuals or department polices are outside the
criminal justice system and thus necessarily do not have the same deterrent effect as criminal

charges. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Contract Breaches and the Criminal/CivilDivide: An Inter-Common
Law Analysis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 559, 582 (2012) ("Criminal punishment would be more severe,
or serve a greater deterrent role, than monetary sanctions.").
116
See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.
"' See NYC CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, A MUTED RULE: LACK OF ENFORCEMENT IN
THE FACE OF PERSISTENT CHOKEHOLD COMPLAINTS IN NEW YORK CITY 11 (2014) (citing N.Y.
POLICE DEP'T PATROL GUIDE, PROCEDURE NO. 203-11, USE OF FORCE), http://www.nyc.gov/

html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/Chokehold%20Study_20141007.pdf [https://perma.cclFR2R-2SV5].
11

Id.

Id. at 57-83 (outlining disciplinary process).
Any such provision-much like the current policy already does-could still allow this kind
of tactic if an officer's life was threatened. Cf. id. at 12-13.
'
See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, New Video Purports to Show Aftermath of the Chokehold That Led
to Eric Garner's Death, WASH. POST (July 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.cominews/postnation/wp/20 14/07/19/new-video-purports-to-show-aftermath-of-the-chokehold-that-led-to-ericgarners-death/ [https://perma.ccl74JY-V49F}; Vivian Yee,'I Can't Breathe' Is Echoed in Voices of
11

120
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cigarettes on a sidewalk, a New York City police officer used a
chokehold that ultimately caused his death. 122
A grand jury failed to indict the police officer on any criminal
charges. 123 Because grand jury proceedings are confidential, it is
impossible to know how the grand jury reached this conclusion. 124 One
plausible explanation is the general nature of the relevant New York
criminal statute on the use of excessive force. 125 It may not be readily
apparent why or why not this method of takedown is reasonable. It is
not clear how the internal New York prohibition on chokeholdsassuming the jury received this policy-impacted their deliberation on
whether the force used was excessive. Because chokeholds are not
illegal per se, the grand jury may have focused instead on the specific
circumstances surrounding the incident. If the criminal code, however,
had explicitly prohibited chokeholds, the grand jury may have found it
easier to return an indictment and find probable cause that the officer's
conduct was excessive. It is not surprising in fact that as a result of this
case, there have been efforts to change the criminal rules to prohibit
such chokeholds. 126
My proposal in some ways is simply the logical extension of this
sort of piecemeal reform. Working with these police manuals, we can
craft statutes that specifically subject officers to criminal liability if
they violate their duties in arresting and detaining suspects. These
kinds of "excessive force" provisions could constitute an instance of
assault, or alternatively, could work as a stand-alone charge. 127 The
form is of secondary importance. This kind of statute could include, as
already discussed, a prohibition on the use of chokeholds by officers.
Another potential excessive force provision could include the
Fury and Despair, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregionli-cantbreathe-is-re-echoed-in-voices-of-fury-and-despair.html [https://perma.cc/DC9V-AZ62].
122
See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died from Chokehold
During Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/
nyregion/staten-island-man-died-from-officers-chokehold-autopsy-finds.html
[https://perma.cc/
2X5E-WV3R].
123
See David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn't Indict Officer
in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/
nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html
[https://perma.cc/37AZ-9RCF].
124 Why No Cririral Charges in Eric Garner's Death, CBS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/eric-garner-chokehold-case-grand-jury-decision-prosecutors-charging-police/
[https://perma.cclYM5X-JN55].
12s See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
126
See, e.g., David Goodman, Police Department to Redefine Chokehold to Match City Council
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/nyregion/police-departmentto-redefine-chokehold-to-match-city-council-bill.html [https://perma.cc/6EHL-FR7S].
127
1 am not necessarily arguing that we should get rid of the current assault or homicide
statutes, but simply that we need to augment these provisions with additional and more narrowly
tailored laws.
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requirement to use a less lethal tool when arresting or detaining an
individual before resorting to shooting a suspect. The Seattle police
manual, for example, requires all officers to carry at least one less
lethal tool such as a stun gun or Taser. 128 States may also consider a
more general requirement-patterned again on Seattle's police
manual-to deescalate a situation through various means such as
warnings, calling extra officers, or moving to a safer position before
using deadly force. 129 The key takeaway here is that we need
affirmative provisions that specifically subject officers to criminal
liability should they deviate from their duties-something that the
current criminal code does not provide.
These specific excessive force rules can, in some way, be analogized
to rules of engagement in the military. The military promulgates
instructions or rules that apply to soldiers who are deployed overseas
and specify the circumstances and limitations under which soldiers
may engage with other forces. 130 They typically lay out when force and
particularly deadly force is appropriatel 31 and their violation can be
enforced through dereliction of duty criminal provisions. 132 For
example, during the United States engagement in Iraq, the military
promulgated numerous rules on how and under what circumstances to
engage a potential enemy target. 133 In the context of a police uniform
code, the aforementioned excessive force rules could be thought of as
standing engagement rules for arresting or otherwise detaining
citizens-an association that courts and scholars have already made. 134
128

See SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T MANUAL 8.100, http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8--

use-of-force/8100--de-escalation [https://perma.cc/6GJV-VJLC] (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).
129
id
"0

The United Sates Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined rules of engagement as "Directives

issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under
which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered." U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 154 (2010),

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new-pubs/jpl_02.pdf [https://perma.cclXZ3D- KHW2] (as amended
through June 15, 2015).
' Mark Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering,
143 MIL. L. REV. 3, 15 (1994).
112
See United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.M.A. 2010) (prosecuting rules of engagement
violation as dereliction of duty and other offenses).
123
See, e.g., Karen Seifert, Interpretingthe Law of War: Rewriting the Rules of Engagement to
Police Iraq, 92 MINN. L. REV. 836, 838 (2008) ("The [Rules of Engagement] are more than
instructions to soldiers; they are a legal interpretation of congressionally enacted law, made by
members of the executive branch.").
134 See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999,
1013 (2013) (discussing how community input should shape police rules of engagement or
guidelines when making arrests or using force); Bryan N. Georgiady, An Excessively Painful

Encounter: The Reasonableness of Pain and De Minimus Injuries for Fourth Amendment Excessive

Force Claims, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 123, 125 (2008) (likening rules for use of force in arrests to
police "rules of engagement"); Owaki v. City of Miami, 491 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1447 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(discussing police rules of engagement on use of force during protests).
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States could also pattern their culpability requirements on the
military's dereliction of duty cases. 135 A knowing violation of these
proposed excessive force statutes would result in the highest penalty.
Presumably, police officers like soldiers would be instructed on these
rules as part of their training. But even if a police officer is not aware of
the rule, she could still be prosecuted under a straightforward
negligence theory the same way soldiers are held to a reasonable
person standard. 136
2. Tailoring police use of deadly force.
Another potential area where internal police manual policies may
be useful relates to the special defenses currently afforded to officers
when using deadly force. As previously mentioned, many states
currently do not impose an imminent threat of serious harm
requirement before allowing officers to use deadly force. 137 They opt
instead for a general reasonableness standard where an officer can use
this level of force as long as she thinks it is necessary. 138 However, some
internal police policies provide stricter guidelines that require
imminent harm very similar to general self-defense statutes. 139
Compare again New York City police policies with its criminal statute
on deadly force. The internal police provision on deadly force, unlike
the criminal code, explicitly says that officers cannot use such force
"unless they have probable cause to believe that they must protect
themselves or another person from imminent death or serious physical
injury." 140 A proposed uniform code could thus narrow the use of deadly
force along these lines.14 1 And given that this feature is already part of
a police handbook, it stands to reason that this change would not
adversely impact a police officer's ability to carry out her duties.
Incorporating this kind of revision can potentially alter how cases
of deadly force are handled. A good example would be the fatal shooting

"' See supra Part II.B. 1.

`
13
138

See id.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.

'9
See, e.g., SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T, MANUAL: USE OF FORCE, supra note 114; OFF. OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, POLICE USE OF FORCE IN NEW YORK CITY: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICIES AND PRACTICES 8 (citing 2014 NYPD Patrol Guide, Use of Force

[Proc. No.] 203-11) (indicating that all uniformed members of service of "responsible and
accountable for the proper use of force under appropriate circumstances"), http://www.nyc.gov/
[https://perma.
html/oignypdlassets/downloads/pdfoig-nypd-use-offorce-report-_oct_1_2015.pdf
cc/8CD2-JF89].
10
POLICE USE OF FORCE IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 139, at 8. (emphasis added)
141
Scholars have similarly suggested aligning police justification defenses with general
justification defenses. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 85, at 1166-82 (evaluating the imminence,
necessity, and proportionality standards).
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of Darrien Hunt in Utah. 14 2 Hunt, who had a history of emotional
problems, was carrying a samurai sword down a busy street in
Saratoga Springs. 1 43 He apparently carried this sword as part of
costume and under Utah law he had a right to carry it.144 After
receiving a 911 call, officers approached Hunt and repeatedly asked
him to put down the sword. 1 4 5 While the facts are in dispute, the
officers claimed that Hunt took a swipe at one of the officers or
otherwise threatened them. 1 4 6 After the offices shot at him, Hunt
started running away and one officer shot him fatally in the back. One
of the officers explained to investigators that "there was no way around
it. I couldn't keep letting him run around with a frickin' sword . .. [as]
he might hack the first person he saw."1 4 7 The prosecutor declined to
bring charges in this case, finding that the officers acted reasonably.1 4 8
Utah's law-like many states-has a general reasonableness
requirement for use of deadly force without an explicit imminence of
serious harm requirement. 14 9
If this state had an imminent threat requirement like the one
contained in the New York City police manual, the prosecutor would
have been more likely to bring charges.15 0 Of course, much of this
analysis depends on how one defines "imminent" in this situation.
Because Hunt was shot in the back, there would not seem to be any
immediate threat to officers. However, he was running in a populated
area with a sword. Was he an imminent or immediate threat to others?
It depends. Perhaps yes, if there were others citizens nearby. But if
there was nobody in the vicinity, this may be a harder case. I am not
suggesting a definitive answer here, particularly as the facts are in
dispute. My point is simply that the inclusion of the term imminent
would have made it more likely that charges would have been brought
in this case. In the end, the aim is to narrow the special defenses
currently afforded to officers while maintaining their ability to perform
their duties.

14
See Jason Lee Steorts, When Should Cops Be Able to Use Deadly Force?, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 27, 2015) (documenting the incident involving Hunt), http:I/www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2015/08/use-of-deadly-force-police/402 181/ [https://perma.cc/Y73D-5K4C].
" See id.
144
See id.
145 See id.
146
See id.
117
See id.
148
See id.
149
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404 (LexisNexis 2012) (discussing an officer's ability to use
deadly force if it is reasonably necessary without reference to imminent harm).
1"' A requirement to deescalate the situation or use a less lethal tool could also have resulted
in charges being brought. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
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3. Conduct unbecoming a police officer.
The prior sections have focused on crafting excessive use-of-force
statutes for officers-either through specific affirmative prohibitions
(e.g. banning chokeholds by police officers) or narrowing current
defenses (e.g. adding an imminence requirement for deadly force by
police). This focus shouldn't be surprising given the current problems
with use of excessive force by police. However, states could go further
and potentially regulate other behavior as necessary through a uniform
police code. For instance, they could promulgate laws relating to stop
and frisk, racial profiling, and interrogation procedures, etc. The UCMJ
itself has over fifty punitive articles-though it seems that the police
code need not be so comprehensive.1 5 1 The UCMJ includes crimes that
one would expect to find in a civilian code such as burglary, rape, and
murder. 152 The inclusion of these common law crimes stems from the
commander's need to maintain order and discipline within the ranks. 153
This rationale applies with even greater force when considering
soldiers are deployed overseas and the government needs a mechanism
to punish them. But these considerations are not present with police
officers. 154 As such, the current state laws in place for such crimes as
burglary and rape would be sufficient to regulate police officer
behavior. This is good news. It simply means that any uniform police
code could be achieved without overhauling all criminal rules. States
would only need to reform a small group of statutes that explicitly
relate to a police officer's duties to arrest and detain.
One useful additional provision-patterned after the UCMJwould be the inclusion of a catch-all "conduct unbecoming of a police
officer" statute. 155 This type of crime-similar to its justification in the
military context-would cover numerous situations that may neither
fall under the explicit excessive force legislation proposed above nor
similar statutes. However, the crime would, nonetheless, regulate
concerns of professionalism and ethical responsibilities.
There is precedent for this type of statute in the police context.
Numerous police departments already promulgate policies that prohibit
a variety of conduct that falls under the general rubric of "conducting
unbecoming of a police officer" and target conduct that is immoral or

11
152

See UCMJ at §§ 880-934 (outlining punitive provisions).
See id. at §§ 918-22 (outlining the elements of each offense).

See Schlueter, supranote 23, at 53-54.
As previously mentioned, the notion of obedience and following orders is not as critical with
police officers and, secondly, police officers carry out their duties exclusively within the United
States. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra Part II.B.2; MCM, Part IV, ¶ 59a.
153

154
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otherwise brings discredit to the force. 15 6 This list includes, for example,
improperly using a firearm, 157 failing to report a fellow officer for
abuse,15 8 engaging in public drunkenness. 159 Violation of these statutes
currently carries no criminal sanctions, although officers can be subject
to dismissal or termination. 160
The traffic stop involving Sandra Bland in Texas provides a good
test case for applying this kind of general professionalism crime. 161 In
that case, a police officer stopped Bland for failing to use a turn
signal. 162 The routine traffic stop escalated after the officer asked Bland
to put out her cigarette and she refused. 163 The officer then ordered her
to exit the vehicle and a verbal altercation ensued after which the
officer forced Bland out of the car. 164 She was ultimately arrested for
resisting arrest.1 6 5 While the officer's action of removing Bland from the
156 See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Public Safety of City of Glenn Falls,
423 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (noting that local New York county department provides that "[police
officers] shall not conduct themselves in an immoral, indecent, lewd, or disorderly manner or in a
manner that might be construed by an observer as immoral, indecent, lewd or disorderly [and]

[alny member who in his own personal conduct is guilty of behavior or reflecting discredit on the
department or tending to bring the department to disrepute shall be subject to dismissal or such

other action as may be deemed appropriate by the Board of Public Safety"); IND. CODE ANN., § 368-3-4 (West 2004) ("a member of the police or fire department holds office or grade until the
member is dismissed or demoted by the safety board . .. [A] member may be disciplined by
demotion, dismissal, reprimand, forfeiture, or suspension upon . .

conduct unbecoming an officer);

Town of Georgetown v. Essex County Retirement Bd., 560 N.E.2d 127, 128 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990)
(officer discharged for "violation of police department regulations proscribing conduct unbecoming
an officer and mandating that her conduct should 'be above reproach in all matters both within
and outside the [d]epartment' and that she should be truthful 'in all reports as well as when [she]

appears before any judicial . . . proceeding"'); City of Mobile v. Trott, 596 So.2d 921, 923 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1991) (finding sufficient evidence for conduct unbecoming of police officer in violation of
police department policy).
' See, e.g., Powell v. Middletown Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 782 A.2d 617 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)
(upholding termination of police officer for conduct unbecoming for pointing gun at fellow officer in

public).
" Matter of Hunt, 1993 WL 5540 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (upholding termination of officer for
failing to report colleague's assault of arrestee).

'59 See, e.g., Tittle v. City of Conway, 599 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding
dismissal of officer for public intoxication).
160

See supra notes 156-159. Courts have found that these statutes are not unconstitutionally

vague, and so criminalizing them shouldn't pose constitutional difficulty. See, e.g., Flanagan v.
Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1569-70 (10th Cir. 1989); Mclsaac v. Civil Serv. Com'n, 648 N.E.2d 1312,
1313-14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995); see supra note 57.
161 See Abby Phillip, A Trooper Arrested Sandra Bland After She Refused to Put Out a
Cigarette. Was It Legal?, WASH. POST (July 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/07/22/a-trooper-arrested-sandra-bland-after-she-refused-to-put-out-acigarette-was-it-legal [https://perma.cc/HX9D-6QGL].
162 See Danny Cevallos, Was the Sandra Bland Traffic Stop Legal-and Fair? CNN (July 23,
2015),

http: /www.cnn.com/2015/07/23/opinions/cevallos-sandra-bland-traffic-stop/

cc/K7LU-8CZP].
163

Id.

164

Id.

16'5

Id.

[https://perma.
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car and subsequent arrest may have been lawful,16 6 there is a question
of whether the officer could have handled the situation better or
otherwise acted more professionally. 167 One Texas state representative
said that the officer "lost his composure and, as a result of that, his
professionalism and what he was taught as it relates to interacting
with citizens." 168
A conduct unbecoming statute could effectively deter this kind of
behavior. What would otherwise potentially be lawful-e.g., not falling
under my proposed excessive force statutes-could nonetheless be
criminal if an officer fails to perform at the highest professional or
ethical level. The officer in the Bland arrest may have breached this
standard. It would obviously be up to a prosecutor and ultimately a jury
whether the officer's conduct actually fell below this standard. But at
least this statute could provide a mechanism to hold this officer
responsible for his actions. 169
Another effective use of a conduct unbecoming statute would be in
cases where police officers fail to disclose unlawful conduct committed
by fellow officers. The "police code of silence" phenomenon refers to "the
refusal of a police officer to 'rat' on fellow officers, even if the officer has
knowledge of wrongdoing or misconduct." 170 A conduct unbecoming
statute would work well in this kind of situation. It would promote good
behavior from officers and encourage them to disclose wrongdoings by
their colleagues or suffer potential criminal sanction.
These professionalism statutes ultimately would work side-by-side
with the more specific excessive force statutes described above. The

'6
See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (police have constitutional authority
to order person out of car during routine traffic stop); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 38.03 (West 2015)
(person can be arrested for resisting arrest regardless of whether underlying arrest was lawful);
Cevallos, supra note 162 (noting that the Court has not directly addressed ordering of putting out
a cigarette, but the procedure is probably constitutional because of safety for the officer during the
traffic stop). It is not clear if my proposed excessive force statutes would change this result
assuming the police officer did not otherwise exceed the physical force needed to take Bland out of

the car.
167 See Seth Stoughton, Cop Expert: Why Sandra Bland's Arrest Was Legal but Not Good
Policing, TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 24, 2015), http:ltalkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/sandra-blandvideo-legal-but-not-good-policing) [https://perma.ccV8LD-EQ84] ("An officer's actions can be
entirely lawful, and yet fail to meet the high standards that we should expect from our law
enforcement professionals, our community guardians.").
'68 Phillip, supra note 161. My analysis, of course, does not include her subsequent death or
the circumstances surrounding it.
19 However, it is worth noting that the officer was recently indicted on perjury charges
relating to the arrest. See David Montgomery, Texas Trooper Who Arrested Sandra Bland Is
Charged with Perjury, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/us/texasgrand-jury-sandra-bland.html?_r=0.
17o Myriam Giles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 64 n.202 (2000) (listing sources in support of the argument
that the "code of silence" is a well-documented phenomenon).
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point here is to construct a code that, like the UCMJ, employs a variety
of criminal provisions, including tailored crimes, specifically defined
defenses, and a general catch-all provision so that all facets of police
behavior are covered.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A.

Tackling Police Brutality: An Optimistic Road

Promulgating a uniform code is only half the battle. Prosecutors
must still bring these charges against officers. 17 1 Because prosecutors
work closely with officers on a daily basis, they may not be as
motivated to prosecute these individuals. 172 My proposal for a uniform
code would not completely extinguish this potential concern. Given the
nature of their relationship, prosecutors will always deal with
institutional or other pressure not to bring charges against officers1 73
Nevertheless, my proposal could help incentivize prosecutors to bring
appropriate charges.
As it stands, prosecutors are expected to make decisions on
criminal rules that are general in nature. The current police-oriented
defenses make references to reasonable use of force without specifying
what that actually means. This leaves prosecutors with wide discretion
on whether to bring a charge of assault or homicide. 174 A uniform code
and its more specific provisions could be beneficial here.17 5 Prosecutors
may find it easier to bring charges against officers if the language
explicitly prohibits the conduct (e.g. use of chokeholds constitutes
assault) compared with the more general language in current use. Or at

1'i
For example, there has been concern that the military has not done a good enough job in
bringing sexual assault charges even though these violations are part of the UCMJ. See, e.g., Bedi,
supra note 26; Eric Carpenter, The Military's Sexual Assault Blind Spot, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIV.
RTS. & Soc. JUST. 383 (2015); Helene Cooper, Pentagon Study Finds 50% Increase in Reports of
Military Sexual Assaults, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/
us/military-sex-assault-report.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RSE3-5GW4].
172 See, e.g., Joanna Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 443
(discussing how prosecutors, while having the resources and leverage to bring cases against
officers, may not have sufficient motivation given their close working relationship); David
Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 499
(1992) ("prosecutors do not like prosecuting fellow law enforcement officers (with whom they work
on a day-to-day basis)"); Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop, supra note 106, at 184 ("the criminal justice
system requires prosecutors and police to work closely together. Because of the need for trust and
openness in that working relationship, prosecutors are naturally averse to bringing criminal
charges against police. There is understandable reluctance to prosecute a member of 'the team"').
173
See supra note 172.
14
See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
175
More specific provisions would also make it easier for grand juries to indict compared with
the general provisions currently in place. See id.
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the very least, they will have a harder time justifying not bringing
charges when the officer has more clearly committed a violation.
A general conduct unbecoming statute could also potentially
promote prosecutions that would otherwise not take place. While it is
true this provision is also general in nature, like the reasonablenessbased special defenses currently in place, its overall function of
representing a higher ethical standard for police officers may,
nonetheless, motivate prosecutors to bring charges more readily than
simply a more neutral, reasonableness provision.
Overall, this type of uniform police code will in turn help restore
confidence in police accountability. Promulgation and enforcement of a
police uniform code signals to the community that with a police officer's
powers comes commensurate special obligations and restrictions that
go beyond a general citizen's code of conduct.176
B.

State Statutory Change and Service Connection

The foregoing analysis assumes that states will take the lead on
crafting a uniform code for their respective jurisdictions. State
regulation is necessary because the federal criminal code would be
restricted by federalism concerns and thus not be as comprehensive as
a state code.17 7 I recognize that my justification for such a criminal
code, nonetheless, draws on the UCMJ, which is a federal statute.1 78
This key difference is not problematic for my overall argument. For one
thing, federal law as a first step toward ultimate state action is not
entirely impossible. Congress could pass a "Uniform Federal Law
Enforcement Code" to govern the conduct of federal law enforcement
agencies (FBI, ATF, DEA, etc.). This could provide a model for state to
replicate-an intermediate step in adopting the principles of the UCMJ
in the policing context. In fact, this is what states have already done in
the military context. Many individual states have promulgated their

176

Cf Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 476

(1997) ("Criminal law rules can contribute to normative forces; they can shape, alter, and guide

those forces, but only if the community accepts the law as a legitimate source of moral authority.").
177 Only a constitutional violation would garner federal jurisdiction, which
necessarily would
not include all police actions or harms. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-09
(1945) (finding that federal criminal liability is naturally restricted to "respect the proper balance
between the States and the federal government in law enforcement" and thus "[tihe fact that a
[defendant] is assaulted, injured, or even murdered by state officials does not necessarily mean
that he is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States"); United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1972) ("we do not so intimate that
every assault by a police officer or official of a state or territory ipso facto transfers a state offense
to an offense of constitutional dimensions under 18 U.S.C. § 242"); David Dante Troutt, Screws,
Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality
Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 60-64 (1999) (discussing the mens rea analysis in Screws).
178
See supra note 24.
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own military code patterned after the UCMJ that applies to soldiers
when they are acting as part of their state militia.1 79 But federal law is
not necessary to effectuate my proposed code. Similar to the Model
Penal Code developed by the American Law Institute,18 0 a system of
judges, lawyers, academics, and other related professionals such as
police officers could work together on a proposed uniform police code
that could serve as a model for states to implement.
Another issue is when police officers would be subject to these new
criminal provisions. Here, I think it would be necessary to impose some
service connection requirement. Police officers will be subject to these
rules only when they are performing their authorized duties. Unlike
the erstwhile service connection in the military context, it will not be
difficult to determine whether a police officer is serving in her official
capacity. To be sure, we already do this under the current system and
there does not appear to be any issues. 18 1 The aforementioned special
defenses of reasonable or justifiable force would obviously only apply
when officers are performing their official duties, not when they are
acting in their capacity as ordinary citizens. 182
C.

The Question of Procedural Change

So far my Article has focused on substantive crimes and the need
to change the laws. But if the analogy to military justice holds, there is
still the question of whether the civilian system must also make
procedural changes when prosecuting police officers. As previously
mentioned, the military-in addition to having a unique set of crimesalso employs a separate set of military procedures: most notably,
military personnel perform the functions of judges, lawyers, and juries,
and commanders, not prosecutors, decide what charges, if any, should
be brought. The rationale for these unique features centers on the
nature of the military and its singular mission as a fighting force. 183 It
makes sense that commanders, who are responsible for maintaining
good order and discipline, should decide what charges should be
" See, e.g., Robert L. Martin, Military Justice in the National Guard: A Survey of the Laws
and Proceduresof the State Territories and the Districtof Columbia, 2007 ARMY L. 30, 36.
1so

See Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief

Overview, 10 NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 319 (2007) (discussing history and overview of the Model Penal
Code).
" See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (restricting use of justified force to instances where police
officer is effectuating an arrest or preventing a suspect from escaping); see cf. 18 U.S.C. § 242
(2012).
1
See cf. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986-88 (1st Cir. 1995).
' See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that
the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society."); United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) ("Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies
and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.").
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brought against a subordinate within their command. 184 As a
deployable force, it also stands to reason that the participants of the
system should be other soldiers to ensure the system can be easily
administered.1 8 5 Furthermore, a criminal justice system made up of
soldiers for soldiers seems to assure fairness in the administration of
justice as soldiers can relate to the duties of defendants.18 6 They may
have a better sense than civilians as to what constitutes dereliction of
duty.
Before reaching the question of a separate system for police
officers, one must recognize that even in the military context-and as a
counterpart to the above line of reasoning-procedure and substance
are not a package deal. Some countries, for instance, retain a separate
criminal code for soldiers but employ the same procedural system used
for civilians. 187 Scholars, in fact, have suggested that there is no reason
why the United States cannot administer substantive military crimes
through the general civilian federal trial process, at least for crimes
committed in the United States.1 88 They also specifically argue that
civilian prosecutors-not military commanders-should decide what
charges should be brought. 189 Others, however, argue that it is
important to retain distinct military procedures and command-centric
discretion so that we have a flexible system capable of use in times of
peace or conflict abroad.190

Regardless of where one comes out on the issue of separate
military procedures, the creation of a unique criminal justice system for
police officers is not as compelling. This may sound inconsistent given
my analogy between police officer and soldiers. Much of this paper has
argued that police officers have extraordinary responsibilities and
powers comparable to military soldiers. If the nature of police work is
so extraordinary as to warrant criminal laws targeting this one type of
employment, why is it so obvious that citizens who have never been in
"4 David Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Songs for Reform, 73
A.F. L. REV. 193, 209-11 (2015) (explaining why commanders should retain prosecutorial
discretion).
'8
See id. at 214-20 (discussing the involvement of various servicemen in the court-martial
process).
'86 See, e.g., Daniel Maurer, Note, The UnrepresentativeMilitary Jury: DeliberateInclusion of
Combat Veterans in the Military's Venire for Combat-IncidentalCrimes, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 803
(2009). But see John Van Sant, Trial by Jury of Military Peers, 15 A.F. L. REV. 185 (1973).
1s7
See Edward Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398 (1973)
(noting that countries like Germany and Sweden try soldiers by the civilian process).
8 See, e.g., id. Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial:Time to Play Taps?, 28
Sw. U. L. REV. 481 (1999) (calling for the abolishment of the court-martial during times of peace
for crimes committed in the United States by soldiers).
' See Spak & Tomes, supra note 188, at 512-19.
In See, e.g., Kenneth Hodson, Military Justice: Abolish or Change?, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 31, 3540 (1973); Schlueter, supra note 183, at 209-11; Moorman, supra note 30, at 190-91.
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these positions should sit in judgment of those who have? The reason
against changing the current procedure relates back to context in which
police officers carry out their duties. As previously discussed, police
officers-unlike soldiers-carry out their duties within communities.1 9 1
The purpose of police action is to protect and regulate citizen behavior.
The recent concerns over police abuses, in fact, deal with crimes against
citizens, not fellow officers. Accordingly, the current criminal
procedural system should remain intact. Police officers should be
prosecuted and tried by civilians because their duties-and thus any
resultant criminal liability from them-are inexorably intertwined with
civilian interaction. 192 Soldiers, on the other hand, carry out their work
apart from civilians, often being deployed overseas. Their duties thus
are not bound up with the general civilian population nor are they
responsible for regulating citizen behavior. 193
My proposal for adding specific affirmative crimes to regulate
police behavior does not change this analysis. Prosecutors and jurors,
who may not have any experience as a police officer, already make
decisions based on the current general provisions regarding the
reasonableness of police conduct. 194 What constitutes justified force?
Was use of deadly force reasonable? These are all questions prosecutors
and juries have to make before charging or convicting police officers.
The insertion of more specific statutes along the lines I suggest (e.g.
prohibition of chokeholds and de-escalation of force) only seems to make
their jobs easier not harder. 19 5

191

See infra Part III.A.

The ability of citizens to participate in the promulgation of a uniform code in this way
bolsters the model of communities playing an active role in policing. See cf. Debra Livingston,
192

Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New

Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 575-76 (1997).
193
In fact, federal law prohibits this type of interaction. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (200)
(providing that "[w]hoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than two years, or both."); Kealy, supra note 71, at 384-88 (discussing history of Posse Comitatus
Act and its narrowing in certain circumstances).
'See, e.g., supra, Part III.B. Medical malpractice claims are another area where we as a
society ask jurors to make decisions on expert testimony with little relevant experience in the

subject area. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA
L. REV. 909 (2002)
195 See also Part W.A.
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V. CONCLUSION

My focus has been on the conceptual justification and general
applicability of a uniform code of police justice. Admittedly, there
remains the question of implementation by state legislatures. Laws will
have to be changed for such sweeping reform. I recognize that this kind
of enterprise takes political capital and will naturally confront
challenges.
But despite long odds of such a code being implemented, now may
be the opportune time to introduce this type of innovative statutory
scheme given the groundswell of support and discussion regarding
police reform. A tailored made criminal law scheme-analogous to the
UCMJ-would seem to cure many of the problems identified with the
current criminal statutes we rely on to regulate office behavior. Certain
interest groups-police officers and their unions most notably-may
naturally be opposed to such changes. But my proposal would benefit
police officers as much as citizens. A more narrowly tailored set of
criminal laws would give officers a clearer sense of what is expected of
them. This would help foster an atmosphere of compliance that would
increase the positive perception of police behavior.
All this being said, there is still value to discussing this kind of
reform, even if it has no realistic chance of being implementing any
time soon. For one thing, we should reflect-even if only in the
abstract-on systematic changes that can help curtail police abuses.
Moreover, this discussion can still serve some practical import in the
near term. For example, it may help with the piecemeal reform
measure currently taking place in New York regarding criminalizing
chokeholds. Invoking the UCMJ and the similarity between soldiers
and police officers can help bolster the arguments for activists in New
York and potentially other states. This type small-scale reform is a step
in the right direction and may ultimately lead to more sweeping
changes along the lines articulated in this Article.

